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Interest, nations, and the state in development:
Instability in archipelic Southeast Asia
Damien Kingsbury, International Development Studies, Deakin University
The Southeast Asian archipelago has become marked by divisions
within existing states, placing significant local constraints upon
the process of ‘development’. These divisions include ‘vertical’
challenges to the state, i.e. they have the capacity to split the state
into geographic divisions based on proto-nationalist identity, and
‘horizontal’ challenges to the state, defined by ethnic and
communal rivalry and conflict. This brief paper will canvas some
issues in such divisions.
In Indonesia, vertical challenges exist in Aceh and West Papua,
and arguably Maluku, (Moluccas) while horizontal challenges exist
between Dayak and Madurese transmigrants in West and Central
Kalimantan, and between religious groups (Christians and
Muslims) in Maluku and in Central Sulawesi. Beyond this, there
has also been racial violence against ethnic Chinese, notably in
1998, and between other religious, regional and political groups.
All of this is set against a backdrop of continuing economic chaos,
a weak state and an often brutal, coercive and politically engaged
armed forces (Kingsbury 2003b). Malaysia’s racial violence has
been relatively quiet since the late 1960s, although there have
been recent clashes between ethnic Malays and ethnic Chinese.
Resentment towards peninsula Malays by the inhabitants of
northern Borneo (Sarawak and Sabah) have also been noted, in
particular by the indigenous ‘Dayak’ groups towards exploitation
of natural resources. Further to the east, the Philippines continues
to be wracked by a corrupt and self-serving elite, a weak state, a
geographically resurgent New People’s Army (see Collier 2002)
and, posing a vertical challenge, an active Moro Islamic Liberation
Front, Moro National Liberation Front, and Abu Sayyef, all
operating under an Islamic umbrella.
Interest
Within state formation, the idea of the state, interest is the defining
characteristic of political identity. Interest can be manifested as ‘self-
interest’ (of oneself and one’s immediate family or group); ‘shared
interest’ (concurrent with the wider group); ‘enlightened self-interest’
(of oneself through helping secure the fortunes of others); and
‘altruism’ (primarily to benefit others). Of these types of interest,
self-interest and shared interest tend to dominate most societies,
although aspects of the latter two types of interest are often held up
as the public ideal. Shared or aggregate interest is the basis of joint
claims and as such is the foundation of political groupings and
equally has the capacity to define political groups not just in their
own terms but in opposition to each other (competing interest).
These types of interest fall into further sets of categories
within the context of the Southeast Asian archipelago. Modernist
political conceptions locate aggregate interest as most common
in industrially developed, literate and contiguous political
communities, identifying interest across communities similarly
located within an economic framework (e.g. factory workers,
‘middle class’, etc.) but who are unlikely to personally know each
other (see Anderson 1991). Such communities that express their
aggregate interest as policy preference, are the basis of modern
political parties. They are identified with more ‘advanced’ or
modernist conceptions of political development and are usually
regarded as necessary for the functioning of a modernist national
polity (Kingsbury 2003a).
In Indonesia, aggregate interest is limited as a consequence of
the relatively recent trend towards industrialisation and because
of the logistical difficulties in establishing communication and
common interest across the archipelago. It is also limited because
of the success of the New Order in severely restricting the
development of aggregate interest groups and genuine political
parties (re Parati Komunis Indonesia or PKI, the Indonesian
Communist Party, see McVey 1997:96-117, 1990:5-27), and its
reification of local identity.
In times of such tension communally based political societies
tend to retreat to ethnic or community group loyalty despite what
might otherwise be an underlying material commonality of interest
between groups, or division of interest within a particular group.
Distinctions between communal groups tend to be made on
grounds of social or cultural identification and indeed their primary
focus may well not be political, hence they are sometimes are not
well equipped to address complex policy issues. This is because
the inherent tension between aggregate communal interest and
sub-aggregate interest does not allow the development of coherent
or internally consistent policy positions. Political parties often retain
aspects of communalism, but in theory at least they aim to address
issues that extend beyond the immediate tribal or communal group
and may distinguish fundamental differences of interest within
such a group.
Malaysia has most successfully combined communal and
modernist political considerations, in part by adopting
economically discriminatory ‘repressive-responsive’ policies
(Crouch 1996). In the Philippines the tensions are between the
self-interested elite and appeals to populism within a nominally
democratic framework. This under-developed aggregation
produces a lack of internal coherence in policy making, which has
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been reflected in the Philippines political history. Indonesian
politics is characterised by political parties based on communal
interest (notably the Islamic parties) or loyalty based on cascading
systems of patronage (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia - Perjuangan,
Golkar). Within such elite-driven systems, the (usually) charismatic
party leaders derive loyalty primarily to themselves as individuals
and not to the party institution.
Vertical or proto-nationalist interest tends to have pre-colonial
foundations (e.g. Acehnese sultanate, Sulu sultanate), some of
which were enhanced or exacerbated by colonial and post-colonial
processes. These could be said to include the encouragement of
regional identity for the purposes of divide and rule, the use of
soldiers from one area against the peoples of another, and through
the relocation of ‘loyalists’ to areas where loyalty is suspect (e.g.
East Timor, Maluku, Aceh, West Papua, Mindanao, Sarawak),
often under the guise of relieving population pressure in loyalist
heartlands.
Regional state formation
States and nationalist groups define their appeal to solidarity in
modernist terms, appeals to ‘post-modernism’ being reflected in
claims to both global and local challenges to existing states.
However, globalism regards the state as the basic unit of
international relations and with the capacity to make law, wage
war and so on, while localism is expressed either as claims to a new
statehood or for greater recognition within existing states. The
territory of states may not necessarily be contiguous, although if it
is not there usually needs to be some national or historical precedent
for the existence of the state. States also do not have to be based on
a single national group, although without a core national group,
or the identification of a set of nationalist values around which a
core can cohere, a state would be subject to significant and possibly
destructive internal tensions.
Globally, earlier models of the state were significantly different
to the modern state form, notably in the ambiguity of earlier state
boundaries and the extent of their authority. The model of the
Hindu-Buddhist mandala has been used to describe pre-colonial
Southeast Asian states, with the state in this case focussing on the
centre and receding in the assertion of its authority towards the
periphery (see Kingsbury 2001:14-18). In archipelic Southeast
Asia island states claims to sovereignty were rarely unchallenged
and often fanciful. We read some of the claims of the Majapahit
and Sri Vijaya empires, but little of the thoughts of their more
distant subjects.
Colonialism in the archipelago initially operated similarly to
existing states, establishing bases of authority from which they
initially asserted a claim to economic advantage. It was only when
there was a shift from trade with existing states to controlling
those states and then developing economic endeavour (e.g.
plantations, mineral extraction) that colonialism began to replicate
a European/modernist understanding of state authority, complete
with territorial boundaries, assertions of legal sovereignty, and
institutional structures.
Legitimacy of the state
The legitimacy of the state rests on whether or not it has the
capacity or desire to represent political agreement with its
constituent groups. The legitimacy of a state is also derived from
its appeal to a right to exist, e.g. Indonesia is the successor state to
the Netherlands East Indies (NEI), claiming external recognition
of that claim. That is, the state can claim legitimacy as a successor
to a pre-existing state or states, and as the (romanticised)
embodiment of the aspirations of its citizens. However, where the
claim of a successor state does not represent agreement (East Timor,
West Papua, Aceh) or where the precursor/successor state was itself
understood as illegitimate (e.g. NEI), this claim to legitimacy is
difficult to sustain with particular intra-state nationalist groups.
If the legitimacy of the state is in question, the territorial integrity,
or ideology, of the state is usually maintained through force.
Military force to guarantee territorial integrity has been applied in
the southern Philippines, across Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei.
However, this use of force does not imply stability, but usually the
freezing of hostility. In such a context, it is possible for a state to re-
legitimise itself, e.g. through economic growth, the proper
functioning of the institutions of state, and political participation.
However, the experience of the archipelago has commonly been
that the freezing of hostility has been used to advantage by more
favourably placed individuals and groups at the expense of
indigenous inhabitants. Thus regional tensions remain and indeed
build.
This situation of continuing unmet political claims is not able
to be contained forever in a strong (assertive) state, but faces real
problems in a weak (disorganised) state, in which central authority
has reduced coherence. Indeed, the necessity for the imposition of
state power rather than the voluntary acceptance of state authority
implies an inherent weakness in state structure, for which it only
requires changed circumstances to reveal.
‘National’ and communal legitimacy
In terms of the legitimacy of the proto-nationalist or communal
aspiration, legitimacy is both easier and more difficult to
substantiate. In a qualitative sense, the legitimacy of a local claim
can be relatively easy to gauge. No one who had spent any time in
East Timor prior to its 1999 ballot and had even a passingly frank
conversation with its inhabitants could have been left in any doubt
as to the outcome of the ballot. While this was hardly a quantitative
(‘scientific’) assessment, it proved to be remarkably accurate.
Similarly in Aceh, the extent of popular support for the Free Aceh
Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka – GAM), at least among
ethnic Acehnese, is very high. It is a similar situation in West Papua
where the ratio of support for independence is perhaps not quite
as high as Aceh, but significant and undoubtedly in the majority
with ethnic Melanesians (‘Papuans’). More strongly again, however,
popular support for a separate ‘national’ identity could be said to
be high among the Islamic population of the southern Philippines.
But in a positivist sense, without referenda on self-determination,
such claims remain formally unproven.
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expression of the Partai Ra’kyat (Peoples’ Party) in favour of
democratising the sultanate and uniting Sarawak, Brunei and
Sabah.
In the period since the 1960s, and notably since the 1970s, in
North Borneo there has been a different type of political distinction
based on both ethnic identity and upon economic exploitation
and political representation. Ethnic distinctions existed between
the five major ethno-linguistic groups on Sarawak and Sabah, and
along lines of kinship and class (Harris 1956:37), but more
importantly continue between them and the coastal Malays, and
Chinese with whom they are somewhat closer. Since the 1980s, a
high level of rainforest logging in Sarawak has displaced numerous
Dayak communities and engendered a high level of local resentment
and, in some cases, physical opposition (Rengah Sarawak 2002,
Jalong 2002).
Cohesion and the state
Economic underperformance in both Indonesia and the
Philippines has probably been the primary contributing factor in
regional instability. In simple terms, the elites of both countries
have been corrupt and self-serving, and there has been a marked
lack of cohesion around notions such as a social contract. This has
created tensions amongst under-classes whose desperation has
driven them into identifying a range of culprits for their problems,
even though in many cases the alleged culprits are themselves
hapless victims.
In this, economic exploitation of particular regions has perhaps
demonstrated the greatest capacity for regional instability,
accounting for chronic violence in the Philippines, social unrest in
northern Borneo and violence throughout Indonesia. In this there
is a sense that the high level of artificiality in archipelic state creation
has created opportunities for metropolitan elites to exploit the
resources traditionally belonging to the inhabitants of the region
from which they are derived. It could be argued that there are no
states that in some senses are not artificial (see Aspinall 2002), and
indeed as all political communities beyond the local require some
degree of imaginative understanding they are all ‘constructed’ to
some degree. However, the combination of peoples who do not
share contiguity of territory, an original common language, a
common culture, or common histories and myths does detract
from the capacity for a ‘natural’ self-selection of political
communities.
Conversely, colonial empires were constructed and maintained
through violence, or the threat of violence, were necessarily coercive
and did not, according to the claims of independence, enjoy local
legitimacy. The successor states to such colonial empires inherited
the same coercively defined boundaries and faced, as a first
challenge, the issue of their own legitimacy. Liberation may have
been an initial legitimising factor, but subsequent internal
‘colonialism’ acted to delegitmise many of the gains of liberation.
Assuming no other change, such consequent dissent requires
coercion to ensure the continuing viability of the state. This then
creates a cycle of repression and further dissent, the only outcome
As discussed elsewhere (Kingsbury 2001:ch2), the idea of
‘nation’ is understood here as distinct from the state, the nation
being a bonded cultural group that identifies itself through the
expression of a common political aspiration or manifestation.
Frequent although not limiting characteristics of such a nation
include the use of a common language (cultural signification and
mutual intelligibility), values, history or shared set of myths, other
cultural markers such as a common religion, often a common
territory or identified ‘homeland’ and sometimes a common enemy.
Some scholars have used the term ethnie to describe the ‘pre-
national’ community (Smith 1986, 1991), in which the defining
characteristic is cultural commonality but not yet defined in terms
of territory. This idea of ethnie resonates throughout the Southeast
Asian archipelago, being dominated as it is by scores of such ethnie,
only some of which have more recently begun to define themselves
in terms of ‘nation’. The Philippines, for instance, could be said to
comprise of more than 70 such ethnie and arguably it has also
come to comprise two nations, although in formal terms, only one
state. The Philippines barangay accord to this model of ethnie, as
could the greater long-house communities of Borneo/Kalimantan,
and a number of smaller communities in eastern Indonesia.
‘Nation’, however, has a territorial identification wider than just
the immediately local, implying a more developed set of social and
political arrangements.
East Timor illustrates both ethnie and state, and the problems
of becoming a nation. Since 1999, without a common enemy and
with many internal pressures, East Timor has experienced a partial
devolution to local identification, indicating that the process of
nation-creation is not (yet) complete. In the Philippines, the
multiple ethnie accepting Christianity comprise a nation. The other
Filipino ‘nation’ could be said to be the BangsaMoro, which
developed its post-barangay nationalism in response to Spanish/
American/Christian Filipino incursions.
Combined with the Philippines’ Islamic challenge is that of
‘communism’. As a consequence of lack of ideological clarity, internal
purges (see Weekly 1996:35-7) and the collapse of international
communism, the New People’s Army (NPA) in the 1990s devolved
to comprise a number of groups, notably on the islands of Luzon,
Negros, Cebu and Mindanao. The primary characteristic of these
groups is their geographic locations and ethnic identity. In this,
class conflict was divided vertically by ethnicity and geography.
However, the NPA has regrown to double its size to 12,000 (Collier
2002:1), and has rebuilt its conventional aggregate base.
In northern Borneo, no such violent assertion of local identity
exists, although in the 1950s until the early 1960s there were
divisions that combined both aggregate and ethnic foundations.
The predominantly ethnic-Chinese Malayan Communist Party
was active in both Sarawak and the Malay Peninsula throughout
he 1950s and into the early 1960s, and until the 1970s on the
peninsula. The Sarawak branch, the Sarawak People’s Guerrilla
Force (SPGF) was distinct from the peninsula branch, having
different origins. Similarly in Brunei in 1962, the Tentara Nasional
Kalimantan Untara (TNKU - North Borneo National Army), an
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of which can be instability and, inevitably, weakness. This weakness
plays upon and exacerbates already significant institutional
weakness of a coercive state. A state that holds itself together through
repression may have little internal movement, at least if the
repression is successful, as it has been from time to time in Indonesia
and the Philippines, but it will not be stable and it will remain
riven by internal flaws and weaknesses.
The questions remain, then, to what extent is the archipelago
governable in a conventional, modernist sense, and how the
geography and ethnicity of the region challenges notions of
cohesion and security. It was probably possible to develop ‘national’
identities from ethnie based on colonial constructions if there had
been a genuine commitment to sharing the benefits of the state
under regularised institutional arrangements. However, the failure
to do this and the repression used to control subsequent dissent
has meant, in some cases, that what were once dissident voices that
could be satisfied are now beyond the point of being brought
back into the ‘national’ fold. This could be said to be the case in
Aceh, West Papua and in and around Mindanao. This does not
mean these areas will necessarily be able to break away from the
state. But it does imply that there will be a high level of dissent in
these areas, that they will remain unstable and insecure, and that
will continue to act as an impediment to what is broadly conceived
of as ‘development’.
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